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MINIMALISM: AN IMPLICATION FOR AMERICAN JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF LEGISLATION IN DECIDING OVER RIGHTS?

Luz Helena Orozco y Villa

The diverse theories of constitutional interpretation in the United States share one strong common purpose:
to constrain the adjudicator. Whether is text, tradition, structure or democracy, the prevailing fear behind these
reasons is the inescapable empowerment of the “least dangerous branch” that comes with judicial review. This
anxiety can be explained through the analysis of the systemic and contextual factors in American
constitutionalism. Furthermore, because of the constitutional structure of the United States, there is a permanent
tension in judicial activity between certainty and legitimacy. Therefore, I defend a minimalistic approach for
judicial review of legislation, particularly in cases dealing with fundamental rights under circumstances of
disagreement.

“The spirit of liberty is that spirit which is not too sure that is right…”
Judge Learned Hand

INTRODUCTION
The debate over competing theoretical approaches to interpretation of constitutional text
occupies a fundamental place in Western democracies. Each country, however, has to deal
with its own practical nightmares. Although constitutional review has been entrenched longer
in the United States, it is more firmly grounded in Europe.1In fact, constitutional adjudication
enjoys less legitimacy in the United States than in Europe, where special constitutional courts
where created for that purpose. This situation reflects on every theory of constitutional
interpretation that has been developed since Marbury v. Madison.2
Legal interpretation in the United States, having its roots in the common law tradition,
1

Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and
Contrasts, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 633 (2004).
2
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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involves an inductive process and therefore allows greater variations than civil law
adjudication. However, when interpreting the Constitution, the Judiciary has encountered not
only the restraints of precedents but also, and more importantly, the objection that judicial
review constitutes a “countermajoritarian” force in American society.3Why should unelected
and unaccountable judges decide what the law is? Additionally, there is no provision in the
American Constitution that explicitly empowers the Judiciary to interpret it and to enforce
that interpretation. Furthermore, judges have to deal with an extraordinarily brief document
more than two hundred years old that uses general and broad provisions and that is extremely
difficult to amend. What should be the role of judicial review in the United States?
In what follows, I focus first on the systemic and historic factors in American
constitutionalism that produced the “countermajoritarian objection”.Some scholars consider
as a paradox the fact that a country belonging to common-law tradition (where judges
constitute a legitimate source of law) faces such a strong reluctance towards constitutional
adjudication. I argue that what seems to be a paradox is actually a result of structure and
history in a strong democratic system as the United States.
Secondly, I address the consequences for constitutional adjudication given the American
constitutional framework. Stressing the existing tension between certainty and legitimacy in
judicial activity, I concentrate on the radical effects that Article V’s amendment process
produces in the constitutional dynamics. I defend the idea that the hard amending procedure
blocks in a very important degree the dialogue among institutions. This is the call for
minimalism. Narrow rulings, attuned to particular facts and theoretically unambitious, are the
best medicine against the “gouvernement des juges”,

4

so feared by We the People and

contrary to the American principles framed in the Constitution.
More particularly, following Jeremy Waldron, I explore the idea that under circumstances
3

Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (1962).
Edouard Lambert, Le gouvernement des juges et la lutte contre la législation sociale aux Etats-Unis
(1921).
4
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of disagreement about rights, American judicial review produces an inappropriate mode of
final decision-making in a free and democratic society.5While it is true that minimalism
requires a case-by-case inquiry,6 when judges must review legislation about fundamental
rights where society is deeply divided, a minimalistic approach becomes a rule. Any other
choice would exacerbate the constitutional system and put the legitimacy of the judicial
institution in jeopardy.

I. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IN A NUTSHELL
In 1787, the United States of America adopted its Constitution, concerned dominantly
with the structure of the national government and the powers of its three branches: legislative,
executive, and judicial. In 7 articles, the document outlines the powers each branch may
exercise and how the federal system should be organized. The Constitutionprovides a
deliberately difficult mechanism for changing its terms.7From the adoption of the document
to 2008, this mechanism has been exercised only 27 times. This is the oldest existing
Constitution in the world and among the shortest as well.
For a foreign observer, one of the most salient features of the American Constitution is
that the text details few individual rights. The Bill of Rights, added in 1791, did not even
declare the most basic ones. Instead, it assumed they exist and simply tells the state to keep
its hands off.8 Underlying this structural choice is the American conception of fundamental
rights as essentially “negative rights” of the citizens against the state, predicated on John

5

Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346 (2006).
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1899 (2006).
7
Under Article V, the amending process may begin only if two-thirds of both Houses propose an
amendment or if the legislatures of two-thirds of the states call for a constitutional convention. No amendment
may be adopted until it is ratified by three-fourths of the states.
8
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Overview of Court Review for Constitutionality in the United States, 57 La. L.
Rev. 1019. See, for instance, the words of the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law… abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press”. The emphasis is on the prohibition, not in the definition of the right or its
limitations.
6
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Locke’s theory of pre-political, natural, and inalienable rights.9
Not only do the vast majority of modern constitutions include affirmative statements of
civil and political rights, but they also contain economic and social guarantees (like the right
to obtain employment, to receive health care and free public education). Nothing similar we
find in the American Constitution. Even if it is true that the framers were building on rights as
understood in the British tradition (and the constitutionalization of social and economic rights
was a most foreign concept at the time), constitutional change could have been achieved,
either by amendments to the document or by judicial interpretation, to include these
guarantees.10It would not be fair, however, to say that social and economic rights were not an
issue in the United States. In the New Deal era, there were strong efforts to implement a
Second Bill of Rights, only not through constitutional reform.11 The later was not an
attractive option in light of the “inevitable fact” that any such amendment would increase the
authority of judges.12As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg clearly states, if the United States place
economic and social security guarantees explicitly in the Constitution, “our style of
constitutional review by courts would require adjustment.”13
Then, how does judicial review fit in this government-hands-off framework? In order to
shed some light on the possible answers, it is necessary to analyze the revolutionary

9

Rosenfeld, supra note 1, p. 8.
Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56
Syracuse L. Rev. 1 (2005).
11
Id. at p. 8. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt set forth the notion of the “Second Bill of Rights” in the
State of the Union address in 1944. Roosevelt proposed no constitutional amendment, and no judicial role, but
instead an effort by Congress to “explore the means for implementing this economic bill of rights”.
12
Id. at p. 9. This point is closely related to the American conception of constitutions as pragmatic
instruments, “suited for, and not inextricable from, judicial enforcement”. Sunstein argues that when presented
with a proposed constitutional provision, many Americans tend to ask, “What will this provision do, in fact?
How will courts interpret this provision, in fact?” This distinction between the pragmatic and the aspirational
conceptions of constitutions is crucial to understand the brevity of the American document. It is important to
say, however, that some nations, like India and South Africa, have done relevant efforts to enforce social and
economic rights through their courts. According to the author, a more realistic explanation of the reticence of the
United States towards social and economic rights suggests that American constitutional law could have come to
recognize them, but “the crucial development was the election of President Nixon in 1968, which produced four
Supreme Court appointments. This, in turn, lead to a critical mass of justices willing to reject the claim that
these rights were part of the Constitution.”
13
Ginbsburg, supra note 8, p. 6.
10
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democratic character of the American Constitution and its consequences on constitutional
interpretation. Underlying this analysis is the thesis that defining the United States only as a
common-law country is a radically incomplete statement of its constitutional dynamics.

A. We the People and the Judiciary
Before 1787, democratic self-government existed almost nowhere on earth and no people
had ever explicitly voted on their own constitution.14The Federalist papers, advocating the
ratification of the document, emphasized the “popular rights” that “the people” “retain” and
“reserve” and may “resume” and “reassume”, stressing popular sovereignty as a central
principle of the American founding.15 Akhil Amar underlines the prominent democratic
aspect in the creation of the United States in a scale that had no parallel at the time and its
repercussions in constitutional enforcement.
Amar argues that the framers introduced democracy in each branch of government,
implying a self-conscious conception that stood against monarchical and aristocratic
structures.16Although the word democracy was not mentioned in the document and the
number of representatives was quite low, fixed and frequent elections as well as a powerful
Congress (that the Executive could not dissolve) were two main points of the new
Constitution. Direct presidential elections were not possible due to information barriers,
federalism, and slavery, but it cannot be denied that the electoral rules were more populist

14

Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution. A Biography (2005). Although the ratification votes in the
several states did not occur by direct statewide referenda, the various ratifying conventions did aim to represent
“the People” in a particularly emphatic way. See p. 7.
15
Id. at p. 11. Federalist No. 78, for instance, stated “the right of the people to alter or abolish the
established Constitution, whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness.”
16
Id. at p. 14. No constitutional property qualifications would limit eligibility to vote for or serve in
Congress, nor could Congress add any qualifications by statute. Also, Article I prohibited hereditary government
positions via titles of nobility. Finally, Under Articles II and III, the presidency and federal judgeships would be
open to the common men in a meritocratic process. Juries and militias constituted two democratic institutions as
well.
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and less property-focused than ever before.17
Although modern Americans associate immediately the enforcement of the Constitution
with judicial review, the framers integrated several other enforcement devices in its general
system of check and balancesdesigned to “minimize the likelihood that an arguably
unconstitutional federal law would pass and take effect”.18 These choke points included the
executive veto over bills that violated the President’s understanding of the Constitution,
pardons and the possibility of non-enforcement. Each of the Houses was expected as well to
prevent enactment if “a bill offended its distinct constitutional sensibility.”19Other legal
institutions, as the grand-jury refusals to indict and jury acquittals, contest the assertion that
judicial review was a unique attribute of judges. Constitutional oaths and constitutional
popularity presupposed that “the Constitution spoke not merely to federal judges, but rather
to all branches and ultimately to the people themselves.”20 In this framework, judicial review
was only one more tool in constitutional enforcement, not the widely accepted monopoly that
is today.Furthermore, the document itself says nothing about authorizing the federal judiciary
to review the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
While Chief Justice John Marshall’s claim that the Constitution is “superior, paramount
law” in Marbury v. Madison21is unobjectionable, it is possible to accept that claim without
also thinking that judicial supremacy is a must, or even that courts are authorized to strike
down statutes that violate that law. Larry D. Kramer claims that for the framers, the
Constitution was “a special form of popular law, law made by the people to bind their
governors.”22 Constitutional principles were subject to “popular enforcement”23 rather than
17

Id. at p. 155. Ordinary voters might not know enough to evaluate presidential candidates from faraway
states and a direct national election would be very hard to administer. Regarding slavery, the electoral-college
mechanism favored southern states that could factor slaves into the system.
18
Id. at p. 62.
19
Id. at p. 60.
20
Id. at p. 63.
21
Supra note 2.
22
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term –Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2001).
In Kramer’s account, American constitutionalism has consisted of a struggle between two principles: popular
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judicial activity. According to Kramer, constitutional limits would be enforced not through
courts, but “as a result of republican institutions and the citizenry’s own commitment to its
founding document.”24 Judges would intervene “only when the unconstitutionality of a law
was clear beyond dispute.”25
More than disputing the “historical pedigree” of the judiciary, what is relevant for my
purposes is to underline that, in the permanent tension between democracy and
constitutionalism, the American system favors the democratic extreme.The Constitution,
providing for congressional elections and prescribing a republican form of government for
the states, expresses “its clear commitment to a system of representative democracy at both
the federal and state levels.”26 Even if it can be argued that some of the framers were quite
suspicious of the exercise of power by the People directly,27 it is undeniable that both the
document and the propaganda around it strongly supported popular sovereignty and
majoritarian democracy. Madison was certain that “in republican government, the legislative
authority necessarily predominates.”28Even the textual order of the document, listing the
judicial branch third, makes a strong democratic sense.29
Contrary to legislatures, the framers provided that federal judges would have no say in the
selection of the chief justice, lower federal judges would have no formal input in selecting

constitutionalism and legal constitutionalism. In the first system, “the role of the people is not confined to
occasional acts of constitution making”, but includes active control over the interpretation and enforcement of
the Constitution. Legal constitutionalism, in contrast, relocates final authority to constitutional adjudication in
the judiciary. Kramer claims that it was popular constitutionalism the dominant public understanding at the time
of the framers. See Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 959 (2004).
23
Id. at p. 40.
24
Cass Sunstein, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, p. 28.
25
Id. at p. 28. This is very similar to James Bradley Thayer’s position that a violation of the Constitution
has to be “morally certain” and “beyond any reasonable doubt”. He advocates for a rule of clear mistake. See
James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV.
129 (1893).
26
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980).
27
In The Federalist No. 10, Madison stated that representation would “refine and enlarge the public views
by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary
or partial considerations.”
28
The Federalist No. 48.
29
Amar, supra note 208.
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Supreme Court associate justices, nor the Supreme Court could appoint or remove any lower
court judge.30Furthermore, the Constitution set out important ways in which the judicial
power would be subjected to political control, such as the mechanisms of appointment of
justices and their possible impeachment. No wonder why the court has, or perceives itself as
having, a limited amount of “political capital,” and it tends to budget its expenditure of that
capital in the number and kinds of controversial decisions it renders.31
With this strong democratic structure, a powerful intuition grows about how this weak
Judiciary should intervene in the constitutional dynamics. Is not a coincidence that popular
constitutionalism has such force among American scholars. The main idea of “popular
constitutionalists” is that the authority to interpret and enforce the Constitution is not
deposited exclusively or ultimately in the government, but remains in politics and with “the
people themselves.”32 Although this view implicitly challenges judicial review, it may vary
from author to author. For instance, Jeremy Waldron rejects judicial review arguing that there
is no reason to suppose that rights are better protected by the Judiciary than they would be by
democratic legislatures.”33 Mark Tushnet believes that we should actually “take the
Constitution away from the courts.”34 Taking some distance from these interesting and
provocative attacks on judicial supremacy (or even on judicial review itself), I argue that
where judicial review is only one more instrument in constitutional interpretation and
enforcement, the role of the courts should be soaked in prudence. Each step of the Judiciary
(no matter how audacious or “beneficial) will be under the scrutiny of “We the People”.
Furthermore, in issues where society is deeply divided, the Court will necessarily lose, since
half of the population will not agree with its ruling. Even if it is true that constitutional
adjudication is not a popularity contest, a compelling argument, rooted in history, structure,
30

Id. at p. 209.
Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962), at p. 116.
32
Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 959 (2004).
33
Waldron, supra note 5.
34
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999).
31
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and text, will arise: the countermajoritarian objection. “Nothing…can alter the essential
reality that judicial review is a deviant institution in the American democracy”.35
The existence of Bickel’s famous difficulty in the American context constitutes the object
of heated debate. Michel Rosenfeld describes this situation as a paradox.36Rosenfeld gives
two main reasons. First, the United States belongs to a common law tradition, where judges
constitute a legitimate source of law. Secondly, unlike the United Kingdom or France, the
United States does not have a tradition of parliamentary sovereignty. Why then the Supreme
Court lacks legitimacy to invalidate Congress’ acts? The United States cannot be described
only as a common law country. It is certain that common law has a central place in American
legal tradition. However, the crucial importance of popular sovereignty in the framers’ mind
should not be left unseen. The strong democratic structure described in lines above and the
increasing importance of statutory law and executive regulations presents a more balanced
picture. Furthermore, it is misleading to compare the Supreme Court with European
constitutional courts to explain the strength of the countermajoritarian difficulty in the United
States, for various reasons.
First, Europe has recently created these specialized constitutional courts, explicitly
entitled to adjudicate constitutional meaning. Their functions are widely described in the
Constitution itself, closely related to ease the historical anxieties derived from tyrannical
legislatures such as the one that supported the nazi regime in Germany. The history of the
Supreme Court is radically different. The Supreme Court is primarily an appellate court.
Constitutional adjudication is only ONE of its tasks, and it is not even explicitly provided in
the document. The role of the Supreme Court, and of the whole Judiciary, has to be
understood in the conception of checks and balances, while the emergence of constitutional
courts in Europe, originally proposed by Hans Kelsen in the 1920’s, was a response to
35
36

Alexander Bickel, supra note 2, at p. 18 (emphasis added).
Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at p. 12.
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historical atrocities after World War II. European centralized and abstract judicial review
differs greatly in its origins and scope from the American one, decentralized and concrete.
Although some scholars defend the idea of an increasing convergence of the two models,37 it
is fair to say that in terms of the countermajoritarian difficulty, they cannot be easily
compared. One crucial structural aspect gets on the way: the possibility of institutional
dialogue.
B. Dialogue among branches
Everyday process of constitutional interpretation integrates all three branches of
government and, ultimately, the people themselves. In the framework of popular
constitutionalism, citizens may participate in different scales and means. My assumption is
that they use either Article V to amend the Constitution, or they influence public officials and
compel to incorporate their own constitutional understandings through institutions.38
The degree of institutional dialogue among countries varies greatly. In the American
framework, one factor is crucial: the amending process provided in Article V of the
Constitution. Among the most difficult constitutions to amend are those of the United States
and Australia. The United States requires passage by a two-thirds majority in each chamber
of the federal Congress, followed by ratification by three-quarters of the 50 states
legislatures. Since 49 of the 50 states are bicameral and ratification in bicameral states
requires a majority vote in both chambers, a negative vote by as few as 13 of the country’s 99
state legislative chambers is sufficient to defeat a proposed amendment.39 What consequences
does this procedure create?
Every functioning liberal democracy depends on a variety of techniques for introducing
37

Francisco Fernández Segado, La justicia constitucional ante el siglo XXI: la progresiva convergencia de
los sistemas americano y europeo-kelseniano, México, IIJ-UNAM, Series Estudios Jurídicos, No. 64 (2004).
38
Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of
the de facto ERA, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1323 (2006). Under Siegel’s vision, the dichotomy between interpretation and
lawmaking ultimately collapses.
39
Dorsen, Rosenfeld, Sajo Baer, Comparative Constitutionalism (2003), at p. 91.
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flexibility into the constitutional framework.40 The two usual methods are, first, amendment
and, second, judicial interpretation in the light of evolving circumstances and social norms.
There are “intriguing or mutual compensation effects” of constitutional amendment and
constitutional interpretation, and they can help to understand the relation between the
judiciary and the other branches. However, that does not imply that a hard amending
procedure must be followed by a strong judicial review.
According to Bruce Ackerman, “it is judicial revolution, not formal amendment, that
serves as one of the great pathways for fundamental change”.41Ackerman defends the idea of
a “living Constitution” that does not need Article V anymore to achieve constitutional
change. I argue that this vision may generate very complex issues in terms of legitimacy and
even recognition. The Supreme Court is still recovering from the accusations of judicial
activism during the Warren era, even with the sympathy of liberal scholars. What conclusions
must be drawn from the hard amending process provided by Article V? The institutional
dialogue, desirable in every liberal democracy, has to be ongoing and dynamic. Even if it is
true that courts are not “some bastard child standing aloof from legitimate political
dialogue”,42Article V constitutes a call for prudentialism.
Only four times an amendment has overruled a decision of the Supreme Court: Chisholm
v. Georgia, the 14th Amendment’s repudiation of Taney’s lead opinion in Dred Scott v.
Sanford, the 16th Amendment’s pointed reversal of Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,
and 26th Amendment’s overturning of the result in Oregon v. Mitchell. Acknowledging that
there are mechanisms of responsiveness among institutions others than Article V, the fact that
the Supreme Court might block the dialogue with such a difficulty to overcome its decision,
creates a strong intuition of self-restraint. The invalidation of a law is much more drastic in
the United States than in other countries. Even if it was not conceived at all by the framers as
40

Id. at p. 92.
Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737 (2007), at p. 4.
42
Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577, at. p.4.
41
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an “unchecked check”, the Supreme Court does have, in great measure, the “final word”. The
argument that in its vast majority of rulings the Court is inevitably a part of the dominant
national alliance and does not actually counteract the “popular sovereignty”, instead of
apologetic is actually scary. Why do we need then judicial review of legislation?
Judicial review of legislation is one more tool in defending the “core” of agreement about
the constitutional essentials.43 This set of substantive ideals has been defined by
constitutional deliberation throughout the existence of the document:
[A]ll members of the constitutional culture agree, for example,
that the Constitution protects broad rights to engage in political
dissent; to be free from discrimination or mistreatment because of
one’s religious convictions; to be protected against torture or physical
abuse by the police; to be ruled by laws that have a degree of clarity,
and to have access to court to ensure that the laws have been
accurately applied; to be free from subordination on the basis of race
and sex.44

With this minimal agreed-upon background, taken as the preconditions of a wellfunctioning constitutional democracy, courts can exercise judicial review of legislation with
entire legitimacy. Not because they are experts on process or political outsiders.45 Not
because these issues involve a matter of principle46 and courts are the perfect forums.47 The
reason why judicial review of legislation makes sense is simply because it is part of the
institutional dialogue and constitutional deliberation. It is part of the mechanics of checks and
balances. The Judiciary, in this dialogical system, is just one more tool. Its function,
therefore, must be deeply related to increase reflection and debate at the local, state, and
national levels. Now, the question is how this function can be effectively exercised?
Probably, the best way to answer is to address not only possibilities of the courts to

43

Cass Sunstein, One Case at a time. Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (1999), at p. X.
Id at p. XI.
45
This would be the position of John Hart Ely. See Ely, supra note 26.
46
Bickel, supra note 3.
47
Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (1985).
44
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promote constitutional democratic values but, more importantly, its limitations. The
awareness of the costs of error and the costs of decisions are crucial.48 When judges have the
information and the capacity to produce decent rules, they have good reason to attempt to do
exactly that. But, what if judges lack the information and that capacity? This situation occurs
much more frequently than one ordinarily thinks. In those cases, prudentialism is again the
option. Judges can reasonably limit their decisions to particular facts for fear that broad
decisions will have unfortunate systematic consequences that they cannot predict. The hardamending process, again, should be an incentive for humility. Furthermore, why should the
Court interrupt an active debate at Congress? Perhaps cautious and incremental judgments
would represent a form of deference to ongoing processes that are more likely to settle the
issue. Obviously, this sounds less attractive in principle to the public officials that work at the
Judiciary.
The assertion defending prudentialism goes exactly in the opposite direction of
Dworkin’s moral reading of the Constitution. The Supreme Court is not necessarily well
equipped to evaluate moral arguments, or at least not more than other branches. While
Hercules indeed would know what justice is, real courts may not understand what justice
requires, or may not be good at producing justice even when they understand it. When we
deal with the fact that people disagree sharply about what constitutes a good outcome under
the Constitution, the role of the Judiciary should not be to kill the dissonant narratives and
impose its own, but to enhance dialogue at the same time that it settles the particular dispute.
This is not the currently dominant academic theory of judicial review. Dworkin insists
that “is too late for the old, cowardly, story about judges not being responsible for making”
moral choices, “or that it is undemocratic for them to try”.49 Lawrence Tribe considers is
precisely the justices’ job to make “difficult substantive choices among competing values,
48
49

Cass Sunstein, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885 (2005), at p. 29.
Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (1996), at p. 38.
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and indeed among inevitably controversial political, social, and moral conceptions”.50 The
result of such an approach is what Charles Black named “a sometime thing”, with people
supporting judicial review for the few cases they cherish (like Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka 51 or Roe v. Wade52) and opposing it when it leads to outcomes they deplore.
Faith in judges is related with various fallacies regarding their “better position” to decide
issues about fundamental rights. Jeremy Waldron argues that there is no reason to suppose
that rights are better protected by judicial review than they would be by democratic
legislatures.53 For instance, no matter how many times scholars repeat it, a practice of judicial
review not necessarily protects minorities. Judicial review cannot do anything for the rights
of a minority if there is no support at all in the society for minority rights. What happens if
some elite members do share some sympathy for the minority? The only argument for giving
final authority to judges is that elite sympathizers in the judiciary are better able than elite
sympathizers in an elected legislature to protect themselves when they accord rights to the
member of an unpopular minority.54 That is because they are less vulnerable to public anger
and they need not to worry about retaliation. Therefore, they are more likely to protect the
minority. However, this is not rule. As Robert Dahl points out, “it seems unrealistic to
suppose that a Court whose members are recruited in the fashion of U.S. justices would long
hold to norms of Right or Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite.55
After these considerations calling for a prudent and humble Judiciary, I address the

50

Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1998), at p. 584.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
53
Waldron, supra note 5. In this interesting essay, Waldron sets out four assumptions that make judicial
review illegitimate: a) democratic institutions in reasonably good working order, including a representative
legislature elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage; a set of judicial institutions, again in reasonably good
order, set up on a nonrepresentative basis to hear individual lawsuits, settle disputes, and uphold the rule of law;
3) a commitment on the part of most members of the society and most of its officials to the idea of individual
and minority rights; and 4) persisting, substantial, and good faith disagreement about rights among the members
of the society who are committed to the idea of rights.
54
Id. at p. 7.
55
Robert Dahl, “Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policymaker”, in
Toward Democracy: A Journey, Reflections 1940-1997 (1997).
51
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consequences for constitutional adjudication given the American constitutional framework as
described and the institutional limitations inherent to the judicial role.

C. Implications on constitutional interpretation
The construction of theories pursuing to constrain the adjudicator with the
countermajoritarian difficulty on mind is as old as judicial review. Significant efforts in the
area of judicial prudence have been developed. Thayer developed his “rule of clear mistake”
in the 18th century. Bickel’s passive virtues permit the Supreme Court not to resolve certain
cases, by deferring the issue to the political process, like through the denial of certiorari.Even
if it is certain that Bickel was not a minimalist, he was indeed a democrat. For Justice Louis
D. Brandeis, the mediating techniques of “not doing” were “the most important thing we do”.
Accordingly, Brandeis developedin Ashwander v. Tenneesee Valley Authority56the avoidance
doctrine, reciting the tradition Article III jurisprudence. He identified seven components of
self-imposed restrain:
1) the Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation in a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding; 2) the Court will
not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it; 3) the Court will not formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied; 4) the Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question, although properly presented by the record, if
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed; 5) the court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute unless the plaintiff was injured by operation of the statute; 6)
the Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits; and 7) even
if “serious doubt[s]” concerning the validity of an act of Congress are
raised, the Court will first ascertain “whether a construction of the
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statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided”.57

Brandeis characterized judicial review of legislation as a “grave and delicate” power for
use by fallible, human judges only when its use cannot conscientiously be avoided. This
reluctance was based on the principle of separation of powers, which enunciates that one
branch must not “encroach upon the domain of another”. His prudential approach inspired in
some way Bickel’s work. However, if we cannot say that Bickel was a minimalist, Brandeis
seems to defend narrow interpretation of statutes when they raise “serious constitutional
problems”. He certainly urges judges to avoid making decisions regarding “unnecessary”
constitutional questions. Definitely, his avoidance canon is premised on deference to the
legislature’s role in a constitutional democracy.
This prudential understanding of the constitutional dynamics is certainly much more
congruent with the document’s structure than Dworkin’s idea of judicial activity. However, it
has received a lot of criticisms as well. Some of them are well founded. For example, the
Court’s use of the avoidance doctrine has been inconsistent and sometimes politically driven.
The same liberals that where celebrating it a few years later where praising the active Warren
Court that recognized new constitutional rights. More importantly, the avoidance doctrine
may cause important delay in securing fundamental rights. Narrow rulings sometimes neglect
certainty and they offer little guidance. Furthermore, when the democratic process is in
danger, avoiding a strong and emphatic defense is actually neglecting entirely the judicial
role.
There is a permanent tension between certainty and legitimacyin judicial activity. Judges
must find a balance that allows them to solve the dispute without eliminating the possibility
of institutional dialogue. Is this possible? Minimalism may give some answers.
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II. MINIMALISM AS AN IMPLICATION
A commitment to judicial minimalism is related to a general preference to narrow and
shallow rulings, closely attuned to particular facts. It is willing to assume the costs of
uncertainty to give space to deliberative democracy. However, minimalism does not
necessarily mean “judicial restraint”, if we understand the latter as judicial general
unwillingness to invalidate legislation.
A. Which kind of minimalism?
Those who favor minimalism tend to be humble about their own capacities. Minimalists
prefer to rule cases than to establish rules. Cass Sunstein has defined the “core” of judicial
minimalism as supporting:
[t]hat courts should not decide issues unnecessary to the resolution f
a case; that courts should refuse to hear cases that are not “ripe” for
decision; that courts should avoid deciding constitutional questions;
that courts should respect their own precedents; that courts should
not issue advisory opinions; that courts should follow prior holdings
but not necessarily prior dicta; that courts should exercise the
“passive virtues: associated with maintaining silence on great issues
of the day.58

Many of these measures are inspired in Article’s III jurisprudence, the avoidance
doctrine, and actually they refer directly to the “passive virtues”. Their practice ultimately
leads to narrowness and shallowness in the rulings. First, minimalists try to decide cases
rather than to set down rules. In this way, they prefer to rule narrowly than broadly. The
argument behind is the risk of producing errors that are at once serious and difficult to
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reverse.59In other words, the likelihood that a wide ruling misfires is often high. Secondly,
minimalists try to avoid issues of basic principle. They seek to produce rationales and
outcomes on which diverse people can agree, notwithstanding their disagreement on or
uncertainty about the most fundamental issues.60 In this way they attempt to reach
“incompletely theorized agreements”. Following Sunstein, such agreements come in two
forms: agreements on concrete particulars amid disagreements or uncertainty about the basis
for those concrete particulars, and agreements about abstraction amid disagreements or
uncertainty about the particular meaning of those abstractions. A couple of examples may
shed some light.
In the first category, people may agree to protect free speech, whether because they think
it endorses democratic self-government or because it is an expression of individual
autonomy. Minimalist judges do not bother in solving these theoretical disputes. They limit
their rulings to protect free speech. The second category refers to the possibility that people
agree in protecting equality, whether they think or not that affirmative action is a legitimate
way for achieving it. Minimalist judges will rule in a way that the concrete judgment just
affects the particular case, without making abstract accounts or ambitious theories that would
create a rule.
These decisions reflect the judges’ awareness of their limited place in the constitutional
structure. Sunstein describes this practice as “economizing on moral disagreement”, with
judges refusing to rule off-limits certain deeply held moral commitments when it is not
necessary to do this to resolve a case.61In this context, judges work to ensure that decisions
are made by the democratically preferred institution of government.
It is true that many times a commitment to minimalism is hard to justify. Critics often
argue that it leaves too much uncertainty, when the job of the courts is to provide guidance.
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Justice Scalia deeply disagrees with minimalistic decisions, even more regarding the
Supreme Court. Scalia argues that not only do they introduce uncertainty, but they export
decision costs to others – above all, to lower courts and litigants, who must give “effective
content” to the law.62Furthermore, this kind of rulings leaves judges free to exercise their
discretion so as to favor their preferred causes. Sunstein defends minimalism arguing that it
must be decided in a case-by-case basis. When the issue requires a high degree of
predictability and when the Court has had a great deal of experience with the area, width
might well be justified.63 Nevertheless, when a controversy has enormous stakes, it might be
a good occasion for particularly small steps.

B. Disagreement about rights
Sometimes minimalism is an inevitable response to the practical problem of obtaining
consensus in a heterogeneous society.64 Within the Supreme Court, as within other
institutions, a plural community implicates incompletely specified abstractions and
incompletely theorized, narrow rulings. However the uncertainty this practice may bring,
minimalism is a way to “show one another mutual respect”.
Certain forms of minimalism can promote democratic goals, not only by “leaving things
undecided” but also by allowing opinion to form over time and by stimulating processes of
democratic deliberation.With this in mind, the case for minimalism is stronger when courts
are in front of issues about constitutional rights where society is deeply divided.
Disagreement about rights arises in any democracy, since dissent is appreciated.
Examples quickly come to mind: abortion, the meaning of religious toleration, affirmative
action, same-sex marriage. As Waldron says, “disagreement about rights is not unreasonable,
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and people can disagree about rights while still taking rights seriously”.65 When democracy is
in a state of ethical or political uncertainty, courts may not have the best or the final answers.
Judicial answers may be wrong. More importantly, they may be counterproductive even if
they are right. In these circumstances, judges need to adopt procedures for resolving
disagreements that respect the voices and opinions of the persons whose rights are at
stake.66This means to rule narrowly and shallowly, in a way that will promote sustained
debate and reflection. That is the principle of political equality, deeply entrenched in the
American Constitution. In Waldron’s own words:
If a process is democratic and comes up with the correct result, it
does no injustice to anyone. But if the process is non-democratic, it
inherently and necessarily does an injustice, in its operation, to the
participatory aspirations of the ordinary citizen. And it does this
injustice, tyrannizes in this way, whether it comes up with the correct
result or not.67

The call for minimalism, then, is not a general rule. It becomes imperative under
circumstances of disagreements about fundamental rights, where judicial review would be an
inappropriate mode of final decision-making. Any other choice would exacerbate the
constitutional system and put the legitimacy of the judicial institution in jeopardy. In that
respect, rulings should be catalytic rather than preclusive.68 By reinforcing institutional
dialogue and deliberation, courts are congruent with the highest values of the Constitution:
democracy and popular sovereignty.
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CONCLUSION
In the permanent tension between democracy and constitutionalism, the American system
favors the democratic extreme. The reason why judicial review of legislation makes sense is
because it is part of the institutional dialogue and constitutional deliberation.The Judiciary, in
this dialogical system, is just one more tool. Its function, therefore, must be deeply related to
increase reflection and debate at the local, state, and national levels. This role may be
achieved through minimalism. Judicial minimalism is related to a general preference to
narrow and shallow rulings, closely attuned to particular facts. It is willing to assume the
costs of uncertainty to give space to deliberative democracy. While minimalism must be
decided in a case-by-case basis, when judges review legislation about fundamental rights
where society is deeply divided, a minimalistic approach becomes a rule. This is the most
congruent practice given the constitutional text, history, and structure of the United States.
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